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Biological competition is widely believed to result in the evolution of selfish preferences. The
related concept of the ‘homo economicus’ is at the core of mainstream economics. However,
there is also experimental and empirical evidence for other-regarding preferences. Here we
present a theory that explains both, self-regarding and other-regarding preferences. As-
suming conditions promoting non-cooperative behaviour, we demonstrate that intergenera-
tional migration determines whether evolutionary competition results in a ‘homo economi-
cus’ (showing self-regarding preferences) or a ‘homo socialis’ (having other-regarding pref-
erences). Our model assumes spatially interacting agents playing prisoner’s dilemmas, who
inherit a trait determining ‘friendliness’, but mutations tend to undermine it. Reproduc-
tion is ruled by fitness-based selection without a cultural modification of reproduction rates.
Our model calls for a complementary economic theory for ‘networked minds’ (the ‘homo
socialis’) and lays the foundations for an evolutionarily grounded theory of other-regarding
agents, explaining individually different utility functions as well as conditional cooperation.
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Many societal problems, such as pollution, global warming, overfishing, or tax evasion, result
from social dilemmas. In these dilemmas, uniform cooperation would be good for everybody, but
each individual can benefit from free-riding1. Although societies found ways to cope with so-
called ‘tragedies of the commons’2, the evolution of other-regarding preferences under competitive
selection pressure is still a challenging and topical scientific puzzle.
In social dilemma situations, caring about others can reduce individual success. While profit
maximisation in single interactions would always demand non-cooperative behaviour, repeated
interactions may sometimes support reciprocal altruism and result in human sociality3, 4. But even
in one-shot interactions, humans are not as selfish as theory suggests. A large body of experimental
and field evidence indicates that people genuinely care about each other5–8. They tend to be not
only concerned about individual success, but also about that of others6, 8, 9.
Also in dictator and ultimatum games, the tendency to share is often attributed to other-
regarding preferences10, 11. But how did such other-regarding preferences evolve and spread? It
was suggested that group selection would solve the puzzle12–14 but it only works when groups do
not mix15. Therefore, mechanisms not requiring kin or group selection have been looked for16.
Some authors argue that humans intrinsically favour fairness10, 17. But why do other-regarding
preferences then vary geographically6?
To explain an innate sense of fairness, Gintis proposed a modification of reproduction
rates by culture18. Other models studying the evolution of fairness preferences typically assume
mechanisms in favour of pro-sociality, such as a ‘shadow of the future’4, costly punishment19, 20,
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reputation21, 22, genetic favouritism23, 24, genetic drift25, or local interactions with an imitation of
more successful neighbours26–30. However, the ‘best response’ rule is not favourable for the spread-
ing of cooperation in social dilemma situations, where non-cooperative behaviour creates a higher
payoff, no matter what the behavioural strategy of the interaction partner(s) is31.
Results
Model. Our model does not require any of the previously mentioned social mechanisms and it
even works when the best response rule is applied. For simplicity, we assume a spatial square
lattice with periodic boundary conditions and L × L sites; 60% of the sites are occupied by one
agent each, the other 40% are empty. Agents simultaneously interact with all other agents in their
Moore neighbourhood—the eight sites surrounding their own site. In each time period, agents
can choose to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). For all interactions with neighbours, agents get a
payoff. If two interacting agents cooperate, each obtains the amount R (‘Reward’); if both defect,
each gets P (‘Punishment’); and if one cooperates and the other one defects, the former one gets
S (‘Sucker’s Payoff’), while the latter gets T (‘Temptation’). The agents’ reproductive fitness in
time period t is given by the sum of all payoffs from interactions with neighbours (minus a value
of 8|S| to ensure non-negative payoffs and avoid the reproduction of agents who are exploited by
all their neighbours).
At the end of each period, individuals die with probability β. To keep population size con-
stant, all agents who die are replaced by an offspring of one of the surviving agents. The likelihood
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of parents to create an offspring is strictly proportional to their actual payoff, i.e. their reproduc-
tive fitness. The offspring is born in one of the empty sites closest to the parent with probability
ν (‘local reproduction’), while it occupies a random empty site irrespective of the distance to the
parent with probability 1− ν (‘random reproduction’).
We assume a strict prisoner’s dilemma with T > R > P > S. Although collective success is
highest when everybody cooperates, defection is the payoff-maximising individual strategy in each
single interaction, independently of the neighbours’ strategies. In our model, individuals update
their strategy (cooperation or defection) based on the myopic best response rule at the end of each
period. However, rather than maximising their payoff Pi, we assume here that an individual i
chooses the strategy that maximises the utility
Ui = (1− ρi)Pi + ρiP, (1)
where P denotes the average payoff of the interaction partners j. We do this because of previous
studies and empirical evidence10, 29, 32 suggesting that the utility is not just given by the own payoff
Pi, but the payoff Pj of interaction partners j is also given a certain weight ρi. The variable
ρi ∈ [0, 1]—the ‘friendliness’—represents the degree of other-regarding preferences of agent i.
A purely self-regarding individual with ρi = 0 only cares about the own payoff when choosing
a strategy. An other-regarding individual gives the own payoff a weight of 1 − ρi and the payoff
of interaction partners a weight of ρi. Hence, strategy updates are assumed to be ‘empathic’, but
reproduction is exclusively driven by individual payoff.
When selfishness is fixed (ρi = 0), best response behaviour promotes a ‘tragedy of the
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commons’1. Instead, however, we assume a (genetic or cultural) transmission of friendliness ρi
from parent i to offspring j, which is subject to random mutation. In our model, mutation occurs
with a constant probability µ that is independent of the strategies pursued in the neighbourhood. To
avoid ‘genetic drift’, which would eventually promote friendliness scores of 0.5, the mutation of
ρi is specified such that the offspring tends to be more self-regarding than the parent (if ρi > 0.2):
With probability 0.8, ρj is set to a uniformly distributed random value between 0 and ρi, and with
probability 0.2 it is set to a uniformly distributed value between ρi and 1.
Simulation Results. Our computer simulations start in the most adverse condition for friendliness
and cooperation. At time t = 0, all agents defect and nobody cares about the payoff of others
(ρi = 0). However, mutations will eventually create higher levels of friendliness. According to
the best response rule, an agent will cooperate, if the utility Ui(C) of cooperation is larger than the
utility Ui(D) of defection. The utility of cooperation is
Ui(C) = d[ρiT + (1− ρi)S] + cR, (2)
when surrounded by c co-operators and d defectors, and the utility of defection is
Ui(D) = dP + c[ρiS + (1− ρi)T ]. (3)
Therefore, cooperation is expected to occur for
c
d
>
P − ρiT − (1− ρi)S
R− ρiS − (1− ρi)T
. (4)
That is, cooperativeness depends on the number of cooperative and defective neighbours, but it
also depends on the level of friendliness ρi. We find that, for ρi = 0, agents never cooperate, while
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above a critical threshold of friendliness, namely for
ρi >
P − S
T − S
, (5)
they cooperate unconditionally. For values ρi of friendliness between (T − R)/(T − S) and
(P − S)/(T − S), we find conditional cooperation9, when enough neighbours cooperated in the
previous round (note that, in our simulations, S < 0).
Hence, ‘idealists’ with a level of friendliness ρi > (P − S)/(T − S) happen to cooperate
even when they are surrounded and exploited by defectors. However, such idealists will normally
get miserable payoffs and have very small reproduction rates. They tend to die without reproduc-
ing themselves. In fact, other-regarding preferences do not spread and selfishness thrives when
offspring occupy randomly selected empty cells.
In contrast, when agents reproduce locally, other-regarding preferences suddenly emerge af-
ter some time (see Fig. 1A). How does this surprising, sudden transition from the ‘homo economi-
cus’ to the ‘homo socialis’ take place? In principle, mutations could create a random co-location
of mutation-borne ‘idealists’ by coincidence after a long time28. This would lead to the formation
of a cluster of cooperators of ‘supercritical’ size. Such clustering would dramatically increase the
relative fitness of other-regarding agents in the cluster and create sufficiently high reproduction
rates to spread friendliness.
However, why does this transition happen in just a few generations (see Fig. 1B), i.e. much
faster than expected? This relates to our distinction of preferences and behaviour. When an ‘ide-
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alist’ is born in a neighbourhood with friendliness levels supporting conditional cooperation, this
can trigger off a cascade of changes from defective to cooperative behaviour. Under such con-
ditions, a single ‘idealist’ may quickly turn a defective neighbourhood into a largely cooperative
one. This implies higher payoffs and higher reproduction rates for both, idealists and conditional
co-operators.
The intriguing phase transition from self-regarding to other-regarding preferences critically
depends on the local reproduction rate (see Fig. 2). The clustering of friendly agents, which
promotes other-regarding preferences, is not supported when offspring move away. Then, off-
spring are more likely to encounter defectors elsewhere and parents are not ‘shielded’ by their
own friendly offspring anymore. In contrast, with local reproduction, offspring settle nearby, and
a clustering of friendly agents is reinforced. Under such conditions, friendliness is evolutionary
advantageous over selfishness.
Discussion
In conclusion, we offer an over-arching theoretical perspective that could help to overcome the
historical controversy in the behavioural sciences between largely incompatible views about hu-
man nature. Both, self-regarding and other-regarding types of humans may result from the same
evolutionary process. Whereas high levels of intergenerational migration promote the evolution of
a ‘homo economicus’, low levels of intergenerational migration promote a ‘homo socialis’, even
under ‘Darwinian’ conditions of a survival of the fittest and random mutations. The significance
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of local reproduction for the evolution of other-regarding preferences is striking and may explain
why such preferences are more common in some parts of the world than in others6.
Our modelling approach distinguishes between the evolution of individual preferences and
behaviours. This makes cooperation conditional on the level of cooperation in the respective neigh-
bourhood. Hence, when a few ‘idealists’ are born, who cooperate unconditionally, this can trigger
off cooperation cascades, which can largely accelerate the spreading of cooperation33. Our model
can also serve as a basis to develop an economic theory of other-regarding agents. The advantage
is that it does not need to assume certain properties of boundedly rational agents—these properties
rather result from an evolutionary process. In fact, our model naturally explains the evolution of
individually different utility functions, as they are experimentally observed (see Fig. 3 + 4), and
also the evolution of conditional cooperators9, 34.
A great share of economic literature is based on the assumption of the ‘homo economicus’,
who takes decisions without considering the payoff or utility of others. In contrast to this tradi-
tional view, the ‘homo socialis’ never takes independent decisions, if the behaviour has external
effects35, 36. We might characterise this as a situation of ‘networked minds’, where everybody is
trying to put himself or herself into other people’s shoes, to take into account their utilities in the
decision-making process. As a consequence, besides paying attention to networks of companies37,
economics should also consider networks of individual minds, i.e. social aspects. This is of par-
ticular relevance for information societies, in which individuals are increasingly connected via
information and communication systems, such as social media38, 39. A theory of networked minds
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could make a significant contribution to the convergence of the behavioural sciences41, and it might
also shed new light on social capital, power, reputation and value, and create a fundamentally new
understanding of these40. We believe that this view can stimulate a huge and exciting field of re-
search, and lead to a complementary theory to the one based on the ‘homo economicus’. Due to the
simplicity and fundamental character of the model proposed by us, we expect that it might serve
as a starting point and basis for this new field.
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Figure 1 A random spatial coincidence of friendly agents can lead to the sudden spreading
of other-regarding preferences and a transition from a ‘homo economics’ to a ‘homo socialis’.
The graphs show representative simulation runs on a 30 × 30 spatial grid with periodic boundary
conditions. 60% of all sites are occupied with agents who can either cooperate or defect. The
payoff of interacting agents is determined as sum of payoffs from prisoner dilemma games with
all Moore neighbours. The payoff parameters are: ‘Temptation’ T = 1.1, ‘Reward’ R = 1,
‘Punishment’ P = 0, and ‘Sucker’s Payoff’ S = −1. The strategies (cooperation or defection)
are updated simultaneously for all agents, applying the myopic best response rule to the utility
function of each agent. It weights the payoffs of neighbours with the friendliness ρi and the own
payoff with (1 − ρi). Agents die at random with probability β = 0.05. To keep population size
constant, surviving agents produce offsprings proportionally to their payoff in the previous round.
Offspring move to the closest empty site (ν = 1) and inherit attributes from the parent, here: the
friendliness ρi. However, with probability µ = 0.05, the friendliness of offsprings mutates. With
probability 0.8 it is ‘reset’ to a uniformly distributed random value between 0 and the friendliness
ρi of the parent, and with probability 0.2 it takes on a uniformly distributed value between ρi
and 1. (A) Average of friendliness and share of cooperating agents as a function of time (one
generation is 1/β periods). (B) Average payoffs of cooperators and defectors as a function of time.
Initially, defectors are more successful than cooperators. However, when the sudden transition
from a ‘homo economics’ to a ‘homo socialis’ occurs, the payoffs for defectors increases, but the
payoffs for cooperators increases even more, which implies higher production rates of agents with
other-regarding preferences.
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Figure 2 Local reproduction is crucial for the transition from a ‘homo economicus’ to a
‘homo socialis’. The rate ν of local reproduction determines the probability of an offspring to
occupy the closest empty site to the parent. With probability (1 − ν), the offspring moves to an
empty site that is randomly selected. All other parameters are specified as in Fig. 1. The circle
size indicates average friendliness, while the circle colour represents the share of cooperators. The
values are averages over 100 simulation runs between generation 100 and 500. Even at temptation
levels around T = 1.3, the above phase diagram shows a sudden transition from self-regarding
preferences (small dots) to other-regarding preferences (large circles), when the degree ν of local
reproduction is high enough.
Figure 3 Evolution of the distribution of friendliness in the course of time for the parameter
values used in Fig. 1. The plot shows an average over 100 runs, smoothed with MATLAB’s local
regression using weighted linear least squares and a 1st degree polynomial model. It is clearly
visible that a broad distribution of individual utility functions results, even though everybody starts
off with a purely self-regarding behaviour, for which the utility function agrees exactly with the
payoff function.
Figure 4 Empirical distribution of other-regarding preferences (from R. Murphy et al. 2011,
reproduction with kind permission of Ryan Murphy). (A) This figure shows the primary items
from a ‘Slider Measure’ to determine Social Value Orientation. (B) Distribution of Social Value
Orientation scores from the experimentally determined Slider Measure, as represented by angles.
The dark line is a smoothed kernel density estimation.
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